By LEONARD KARSHIMA SHILGBA
The Nigerian Constitution (1999, as amended) does not expressly designate State Governors as “Chief Security Officers” in legal terms, but the title has become conventional and operational. The relevant provisions include:
a. Section 215(4):
“Subject to the provisions of this section, the Governor of a state or such Commissioner of the Government of the State as he may authorize in that behalf may give to the Commissioner of Police of that State such lawful directions with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order within the State…”
However, the same section limits this authority:
“…Provided that before carrying out any such directions… the Commissioner of Police may request that the matter be referred to the President or such Minister of the Government of the Federation as the President may authorize…”
b. Sections 214 & 215(1):
- Establish the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) as a federal institution, controlled by the President through the Inspector-General of Police. c. Section 305:
- Only the President can declare a state of emergency.
d. Items 45 & 68, Part I of the Second Schedule:
- Internal security and the police are exclusive legislative matters, meaning only the National Assembly can legislate on them.
Deficiencies in the Constitutional Provisions
a. Lack of Operational Control:
- Governors cannot deploy or command police forces directly. The operational command lies with the Commissioner of Police, who reports to the IGP and ultimately the President.
b. Bureaucratic Delay in Crisis Response:
- Security decisions often require federal clearance, delaying urgent local action—as evident in Benue State’s herdsmen-farmer crises. c. Accountability Without Authority:
- Governors are held responsible for security in their states but lack the tools to enforce or coordinate responses independently. d. Absence of State Policing Structures:
- No constitutional provision exists for the establishment of state police. Case Study: Benue State’s Security Challenges
Benue has been one of the worst-hit states in Nigeria’s herder-farmer violence, often stemming from unresolved land use, migration pressures, and impunity.
- The Anti-Open Grazing Law (2017) enacted by the Benue State Government sought to prevent violence, but enforcement has been hampered by the lack of a state-controlled security outfit.
- Even when local vigilantes assist, they lack the legal and logistical cover that federal police have.
- Federal security agencies have sometimes undermined or ignored state laws (e.g., Operation Whirl Stroke’s challenges with coordinating with local leaders).
- The Governor’s power to issue orders to the Commissioner of Police has proven ineffective due to federal override. Legislative Recommendations to Address Loopholes:
A. National Assembly (Constitutional Amendment):
i. Create a Dual Policing System (Federal & State Police):
- Amend Sections 214–216 and the Second Schedule to:
- Allow states to establish their own police forces.
- Retain the federal police for interstate crimes and national threats.
- Ensure mechanisms for coordination between federal and state police.
ii. Clarify Governor’s Security Role:
- Amend Section 215(4) to remove the override by the President or Minister, or to define specific scenarios where federal override is justified.
- Define “Chief Security Officer” in operational terms—giving governors full command over security within state boundaries unless overridden under a formal emergency. iii. Establish State Security Trust Funds:
- Allow states to establish secure funds to support their police forces, subject to National Assembly guidelines for accountability.
B. Actions by State Legislatures (Pending National Reform):
Even without constitutional amendments, states like Benue can:
i. Formalize Local Vigilante Groups:
- Establish and regulate community or regional security corps under clear laws, as was done in Amotekun (SW) and Ebubeagu (SE), while lobbying for federal recognition. The Benue State government can seek legislative framework for ad hoc security contrivances such as “Anyam Nyor”. ii. Collaborate with Other States for Zonal Security:
- Forge inter-state security compacts under Sections 5 and 8 of the Constitution, with federal concurrence.
iii. Institutionalize Civil-Military Liaison Offices:
- Create state-level liaison frameworks for engaging the military and police more effectively.
Conclusion and Call to Action:
The disjuncture between responsibility and authority in Nigeria’s security architecture is a constitutional defect. Benue State’s tragic security history shows how dangerous this defect can be.
A restructured constitutional framework is essential, and while awaiting national reforms, state-based innovations like legalizing and regulating local enforcement bodies and lobbying through the Governors’ Forum can offer temporary relief.
© Shilgba
